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AN EXAMINATION OF RELIGIOUS TAX
EXEMPTION POLICY UNDER SECTION
501(cX3) INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
PAUL H.K. HAGEMAN*T
INTRODUCTION
In these worrisome times of inflation, taxes and shrinking
municipal tax bases, a growing concern arises as to the wisdom of
letting millions of dollars worth of property owned by religious
organizations stand tax-exempt. Many people wonder why they should
absorb more of the tax burden each year when churches and other
religious institutions could just as easily carry the burden. Be assured,
however, that the Internal Revenue Service, Congress and the courts
have a substantial basis for exempting religious organizations from
the income tax and other taxes.
This paper will deal with the policy of exempting religious
organizations from tax on income, especially under section 501(c)(3)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The history of this policy, its
growth and modification and its application past, present and future
will be explored. The application of this section will be discussed in
three areas: education; property; and, all other activities. Hopefully,
this paper will provide some insight into the tax exemption status
of religious organizations and provide some answers and questions
concerning the future of this policy.
I. THE GENESIS AND EARLY INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 501(c)(3)
A. The Source of the Taxing Power
The Constitution of the United States grants to the legislative
branch of the government the power to tax in Article I. The power
to raise revenue is found in several sections of the Constitution. Before
1913, they represented the solitary power of Congress to raise revenue
and these sections were restrictive. Article I section Z and section
8 require a direct tax to be levied on an apportionment basis among
the population and among the states. These provisions gave Congress
* J.D. Capital University (1982); B.A. Purdue University (1978).
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little power to adjust the burden of the tax and the growth of such
revenue.
A more important provision is found in Article I section 8 of
the Constitution where taxation is specifically enumerated as a power
of Congress: "The Congress shall have power: To lay and collect taxes,
duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the com-
mon defence and general welfare of the United States... ".' Through
this provision Congress can tax personal and corporate income directly.
However, the apportionment provisions still control such a tax. The
country was provided with a continuing source of revenue, however,
which served it adequately for well over one hundred years.
At the turn of the century the country was growing well beyond
its sources of revenue. As a result, Congress passed in 1909 and the
States ratified in 1913 the Sixteenth Amendment. It reads as follows:
"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes
from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the
several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration"
With the passage of this amendment our modern income tax was born.
No longer does the government have to apportion taxes on income.
The Sixteenth Amendment brought the revenue powers of the United
States into the Twentieth Century. Now the government could greater
control who paid more of the tax burden. Before this time only
emergency measures such as one during the Civil War eliminated the
need for apportionment of a tax on income.' With the passage of the
Sixteenth Amendment no state constitution may interfere with the
direct collection of taxes on income by the federal government.
The Sixteenth Amendment also made it possible for Congress
to constitutionally for the first time exempt religious organizations
from the income tax. The United States Supreme Court acknowledged
this fact in Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Company where it
confirmed the constitutionality of the Sixteenth Amendment and
thereby Congress' power to tax income and exempt organizations from
the income tax.'
Congress had previously exempted religious organizations under
1. P. DORF, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH A CLAUSE-BY-
CLAUSE ANALYSIS 105-6 (1976).
2. Id. at 166.
3. Id.
4. Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 240 U.S. 1, 21 (1916).
[Vol. 17
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section 22 of the Revenue Act of 1894, but this act was subsequently
declared unconstitutional.' It was not until the Revenue Act of 1913,
section II(G)(a) that religious organizations were exempted from the
income tax constitutionally.
Traditionally, churches and other religious organizations have
been excused from paying taxes because the State has felt a need
to encourage charitable works. Religious groups were not singled out,
but were included with all other charitable organizations. The English
Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601 is the basis for the modern day
exemption. Even then there was concern about "clerical" wealth, but
it was regarded as unimportant because of the need to encourage
philanthropy. The removal of the obstacle of taxation promoted good
works and this policy was established and has been with our society
ever since. The tax exemption on property was just the beginning;
it later encompassed income, inheritance tax, sales tax and state and
local taxes depending on the jurisdiction!
Since the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, Congress has
consistently provided for the exemption from the income tax of
religious organizations in every major Revenue Act that has passed.
Congress has assumed that good works will be fostered by the ex-
emption and stated the following in its report on the Revenue Act
of 1938 through the Ways and Means Committee:
The exemption from taxation of money or property devoted
to charitable or other purposes is based upon the theory
that the government is compensated for the loss of revenue
by its relief from the financial burdens which would other-
wise have to be made by appropriations from public funds,
and by benefits resulting from the promotion of the general
welfare.7
This seems to indicate a willingness by Congress to preserve tradi-
tion. It also indicates the wisdom of such a policy, because it has not
been deleted from any subsequent Revenue Act since it was first con-
stitutionally established in 1913.
The Revenue Act of 1934 was the first such act to add the phrase
5. P. WEBER & D. GILBERT, PRIVATE CHURCHES AND PUBLIC MONEY: CHURCH-
GOVERNMENT FISCAL RELATIONS (1981).
6. Id. at 29-31.
7. P. TREUSCH & N. SUGARMAN, TAx-EXEMPT CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 3
(1979).
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"... and no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying
on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation." This
was probably due to congressional fears about the abuse of such an
exemption. The Congress probably wanted to make sure the charities
receiving the exemption remained charitable. Thus, no one member
could influence legislation or profit from the income to a charitable
organization s This phrase will be explored in detail later on.
No substantial changes were approved by Congress until 1954
when our present Internal Revenue Code was adopted. Then the ex-
emption for religious organizations was placed in section 501(c))3) in-
stead of its former home, Section 101(6). The pertinent part of sec-
tion 501(c)(3) reads as follows:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or founda-
tion, organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, . . . purposes . . . no part of the net earnings
of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder
or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which
is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to in-
fluence legislation, (except as otherwise provided in subsec-
tion (h)) and which does not participate in, or intervene in
(including the publishing or distributing of statements), any
political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public
office.9
Under the Tax Reform Act of 1969 churches were forced to give
up part of their privilege as their unrelated business income became
taxable." The tax on unrelated business income had applied to other
tax-exempt organizations before, but was only applied to churches after
the Act of 1969.
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 also disqualified churches from a
new requirement that newly formed organizations apply for recogni-
tion of tax-exempt status.1' This being the case, churches, their in-
tegrated auxiliaries and conventions or associations of churches will
be presumed tax exempt until further changes in the law.
The most recent modification of exempt status for religious
organizations came with passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. This
Act set up standards for the use of charitable contributions in influenc-
8. Revenue Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 700 (1934).
9. I.R.C. sec. 501(c)(3).
10.Ellis, Tax on Unrelated Business Income of Churches, 7 TAx ADVISER 270
(1976).
11. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172 sec. 101(a), 83 Stat. 495 (1969).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 3 [1983], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol17/iss3/3
RELIGIOUS TAX EXEMPTION POLICY
ing legislation. The purpose of the provision is to create an appropriate
measure of legislative activity which may be done by an exempt
organization before its exempt status will be lost. 2 Apparently many
organizations were not technically within the bounds of section 501(c)(3)
I.R.C. and this legislation ensured that they would be.
The Treasury position during the hearings on the House bill
favored the legislation:
H.R. 13500 is a product of a number of attempts to reach
a compromise among representatives of conflicting interests.
It has been designed to provide certainty and predictabili-
ty to the administration of the lobbying provisions of sec.
501(c)(3). It provides clear quantitative measures of permissi-
ble lobbying activities. It defines with some precision which
activities constitute lobbying and which do not. Finally, it
enlarges the scope of activities in which charitable organiza-
tions may engage without adverse tax consequences.
1 3
In essence, the bill sought to define what "no substantial part" as
referred to legislative activity means in section 501(c)(3).
Charities such as the American Jewish Committee sent letters
to the Committee on Ways and Means in support of the legislation,
because it clarified the vagueness of section 501(c)(3)." As a result
of a statement by the National Council of the Churches of Christ in
the United States of America, several compromises were made in H.R.
13500. Churches, their integrated auxiliaries and conventions or
associations of churches were disqualified under the bill. This means
they are protected by the current language of the section. Further-
more, the decision in Christian Echoes National Ministry v. United
States was not affected by Congress. So, churches may lose their tax
exemption for substantial lobbying, but they still may qualify for tax-
exempt status under section 501(c)(4).15
The National Council of Churches did suggest the Committee
drop the restriction on "influencing" legislation altogether, because
of the church's need to contribute to the solutions to the problems
of society. However, this point was not approved by the Committee
after taking it into consideration. 6
12. Influencing Legislation by Public Charities: Hearings on H.R. 13500 Before
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1976).
13. Id. at 11.
14. Id. at 71.
15. Id. at 78.
16. Id. at 78.
19831
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Ultimately, the bill was approved by the Committee 7 and passed
by the House. 8 The Senate in turn struck all portions of the bill but
the enacting clause and amended it to deal with food stamp purchases
by welfare recipients instead. The Senate believed the substance of
H.R. 13500 had already been enacted under H.R. 10612 as part of the
Tax Reform Act of 1976.'
The Act was considered and amended by both houses and even-
tually passed on September 16, 1976. It was signed by President Ford
on October 4, 1976.20 In its final form, churches were disqualified from
the new provisions relating to influencing legislation by charitable
organizations." This does not mean that religious organizations can-
not lose their exempt status, however. They should be careful not
to spend too much money on lobbying efforts or they will find
themselves in the same position Christian Echoes National Ministry
did.2 Since the Tax Reform Act of 1976, there have been no substan-
tial reforms in the revenue laws pertaining to tax-exempt religious
organizations passed by Congress.
B. Qualification for Tax-exempt status Under Section 501(c)(3)
To qualify as a "religion" or a "church" under the new Code for
purposes of tax exemption, the organization must explain in some man-
ner the meaning of life for its followers.23 Congress and the Supreme
Court have never defined "religion" or "church", but it is generally
accepted that there is some belief in another existence beyond the
present one which is fostered by a particular group in a particular
manner.
The word "church" usually refers to a building set aside for wor-
ship and not the institution itself.24 Hopkins lays out the factors used
by the IRS when defining a church for the purposes of exemption:
1) a distinct legal existence; 2) a recognized creed and form of wor-
ship; 3) a definite and distinct ecclesiastical government; 4) a formal
code of doctrine and discipline; 5) a distinct religious history; 6) a
membership not associated with any other church or denomination;
17. H.R. Rep. No. 1210, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
18. 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 16892 (1976).
19. S. Rep. No. 1345, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
20. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS, 1976, 537 (1976).
21. 26 U.S.C. sec. 501(h)(5) (1976).
22. Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849
(10th Cir. 1972), reh'g den., (1973).
23. D. KELLY, WHY CHURCHES SHOULD NOT PAY TAXES 60 (1977).
24. 84 C.J.S. Taxation SS 289-291.
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7) a complete organization of ordained ministers ministering to their
congregations and selected after completing prescribed courses of
study; 8) a literature of its own; 9) established places of worship; 10)
regular congregations; 11) regular religious services; 12) Sunday schools
for religious instruction of the young; and, 13) schools for the prepara-
tion of its ministers." These considerations help to eliminate so-called
unorthodox churches from tax-exempt status.
A religious organization or church must also show its purpose
for existence is primarily religious or charitable in nature. Advance-
ment of "religion" as defined above is primarily considered a charitable
purpose. Activity in a charitable nature often includes the distribu-
tion of income to the community and not individual members of the
organization." The use of an organization's money must be for the
improvement of society as a whole, not the private use by an individual
or group of individuals for personal gain.
In the case of a religious organization, it seems that the qualify-
ing religion must include in its tenets the advancement of civilization
through good works. Where such an organization does not follow a
primarily religious purpose, it will be denied tax-exempt status.
27
There also arises the problem of religious corporations and the
extention of the tax exemption to such property. The whole area of
activity outside of worship and its tax status will be explored later
in great detail. For now it is safe to say the tax-exempt status was
originally meant to apply only to contributions during worship or other
religious exercises.28 It has since been extended to many religious
endeavors, but not so far as to be out of control. It has not been
extended in the case of a church synod operating a charitable cor-
poration for religious purposes and using the profit for religion.'
Religious auxiliaries cannot be exempted if operated for a profit. The
exemption should not be used for competitive reasons.
The phrase ". . . no part of the net earnings of which inures
to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual . . ." is an in-
25. B. HOPKINS, THE, LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 134 (3d Ed. 1979).
26. Id. at 47.
27. Swedenborg Foundation Inc. v. Lewisohn, 40 N.Y.2d 87, 351 N.E.2d 702,
386 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1976).
28. Evangelical Lutheran Synod of Missouri, Ohio and Other States v. Hoehn,
355 Mo. 257, 196 S.W.2d 134 (1946).
29. Id.
30. The Founding Church of Scientology v. The United States, 412 F.2d 1197
(Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1009 (1969).
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tegral part of section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
The purpose of this phrase is to ensure that the money taken in by
an organization is used for the public at large. The purpose of the
exemption as it relates to religious organizations is, afterall, to foster
their beneficial function to society as a whole. The law states that
where a corporation fails to prove none of its net assets have benefited
private individuals, the statutory exemption will not be allowed." The
courts are very careful to scrutinize religious corporations with regard
to this provision of section 501(c)(3). The exemption is granted because
the organization is non-profit. If one or more individuals in the cor-
poration are privately benefiting from the activities of the organiza-
tion, then the whole purpose of the exemption is defeated.
Briefly, I mention again the lobbying limitation of sec. 501(c)(3).
Many churches feel a need to make policy statements on political
issues. Because social issues are so great a part of values and morals
espoused by religions, the separation of church and state is often
transluscent. The changes made by the Tax Reform Act of 1976 helped
to remove some of the ambiguity from the provision, but because
churches were disqualified, they remain uncertain as to the extent
to which they may engage in political lobbying.
Leif M. Clark in his article, "Church Lobbying: The Legitimacy
of the Controls,"3 believes the lobbying limitation could be removed
from section 501(c)(3) altogether. He points out that the organizations
must be exclusive in its purpose already to have the exemption thus
eliminating the need for further limitations. Clark states two possi-
ble benefits that would result from excising the lobbying limitation:
First, treasury would no longer be able to use the uncer-
tain scope and application of the limitation to harass or
threaten politically unpopular organizations. Second, as a
corollary Treasury's inquiry into the exempt status of a
given organization would properly focus not on the tangen-
tial issue of lobbying, but on the central question of whether
the organization is in fact charitable. 2
The tax exemption for churches also applies to their integrated
auxiliaries. These integrated auxiliaries must however be affiliated
with a church and their primary activity must be exclusively
religious.3 The term "affiliated" refers to the association with or con-
31. Clark, Church Lobbying: The Legitimacy of the Controls, 16 HOUSTON L.
REV. 480 (1979).
32. Id. at 534.
33. Reg. sec. 1.6033-2(g)(5)(i) cited in B. HOPKINS, supra note 25, at 522.
[Vol. 17
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trol by a church or convention or association of churches. It includes
seminaries, mission societies, youth groups and men's or women's
organizations. 4 The main consideration is that the auxiliary somehow
furthers the religious purpose of the church.
Once a religious organization has qualified for tax-exempt status,
it must file an annual statement of income with the IRS using Form
990 or 990-PF pursuant to section 6033(b) of the Code. The following
items must be included: 1) the organization's gross income for the year;
2) its expenses attributable to such income and incurred within the
year; 3) its disbursements within the year; 4) a balance sheet show-
ing its assets, liabilities, and net worth as of the beginning of the
year; 5) the total of the contributions and gifts received by it during
the year, and the names and addresses of all substantial contributors;
6) the names and addresses of its managers and highly compensated
employees; and, 7) the compensation and other payments made dur-
ing the year to each individual described in item (6).3-
A religious organization with unrelated business income must also
file Form 990-T. One problem that arises here is unrelated debt-
financed income. This occurs when a church sells property contributed
to them only to find there was still a mortgage on the land. The in-
come must then be reported as it relates to the basis of the invest-
ment in the property. Form 990-T is due March 15 and Form 990
is due April 15." Many institutions have suffered a lot of unnecessary
grief because they have forgotten this fact.
C. The Constitutionality of Section 501(c)(3)
The power of Congress to impose an income tax and exempt from
said tax certain organizations has already been established under the
Sixteenth Amendment and Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad
Company.8 A number of attacks on the exemption have still arisen
in recent years, however. The primary requisite to bring a case
challenging the granting of an exemption is standing. In 1972, it was
ruled that a Black American has standing to challenge an exemption
to a private club which excludes nonwhites, because the exemption
may foster such activity against public policy. 9 That case was subse-
quently lost and four years later in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
34. Reg. Sec. 1.6033-2(g)(5)(iv) cited in B. HOPKINS, supra note 25, at 523.
35. B. HOPKINS, supra note 25.
36. Meyers, Preparation of Forms 990 and 990-T, 22 CATH. LAW. 256 (1976).
37. Parker, Instructions for Filling Out Form 990-T, 22 CATH. LAW. 262 (1976).
38. 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
39. McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.C. 1972).
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Rights Organization, it was held that indigents have no standing to
challenge an exemption granted to a hospital which did not serve
people unable to afford the services. 4' The organization bringing the
suit could not show a "case or controversy" or the requisite personal
injury necessary under Article III of the Constitution. As a result
of this case, standing to challenge a tax exemption granted by Con-
gress is difficult to establish. The concrete injury requirement is
almost beyond proof.
Perhaps the greatest landmark case in the area of constitutional
challenges to tax exemptions for religious organizations is Walz v.
Tax Commission of the City of New York. The appellant in this case
argued that a tax exemption granted to a church's property in the
City of New York indirectly meant that his tax money supported the
establishment of a religion in violation of the First Amendment. The
Court rejected this idea in favor of a doctrine that recognizes the
need not to inhibit organizations fostering the improvement of society.
The Court noted the exemption was granted to many charitable classes
of property outside of churches. Exempting churches from property
taxation also avoids an excessive entanglement between Church and
State. Thus, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of ex-
emptions to religious organizations.41
In Maryland, in a less publicized case, 2 the plaintiffs also used
the First and Fourteenth Amendment arguments to challenge the con-
stitutionality of tax exemptions for property used for public worship.
The plaintiffs here were atheists representing themselves and The
Freethought Society of America, Inc. As such they did not want to
be compelled through their taxes to support places of worship or any
ministry.43 The court here found no violation of the Equal Protection
Clause because all classes of property belonging to organizations with
beliefs about religion were exempted under the statute in question.
This included the property owned by the plaintiffs for their atheistic
organization. The court appropriately quoted Mr. Justice Holmes, "[i]f
a thing has been practiced for two hundred years by common con-
sent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to
affect it."44
40. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
41. Walz v. Tax Commission of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
42. Murray v. Comptroller of the Treasury, State of Maryland, 241 Md. 383,
216 A.2d 897 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 816.
43. Id. at 902.
44. Mr. Justice Holmes in Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922),
cited in Murray, 216 A.2d 897 at 907.
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Courts rarely have found tax exemption statutes violative of the
Constitution. To my knowledge section 501(c)(3) has never been found
unconstitutional, because it is consistent with the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Ever since Sherbert v. Verner, the free exercise of
religion has been fostered by states where no compelling state in-
terest overrides it.45 Establishment of religion has not been the course
to follow in trying to overturn a tax exemption. The course of viola-
tion of the Due Process Clause has been successful however, where
a loyalty oath was required for persons or organizations requesting
tax-exempt status." We are left with the proposition that tax exemp-
tions for religious organizations do not violate the Constitution in
substance and rarely do in procedure.
II. APPLICATION OF SECTION 501(c)(3) TO RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
A. Parochial Educational Institutions
Having established the origins of tax exemptions for religious
organizations and their constitutionality, we turn now to a discussion
of the application of section 501(c)(3) to specific areas of religious
organizations.
. Many churches ifi our society also operate schools. The purpose
is to provide parents of the particular faith with an alternative to
public education for their children. Many parents prefer their children
to receive a Christian education as opposed to a purely secular one.
For this reason many faiths, especially the Catholic and Lutheran
churches, have established and maintained their own schools. Such
schools are eligible for the educational tax exemption under section
501(c)(3), but we are concerned here with their tax exempt status as
an integrated auxiliary of a religious organization.
Due to their religious affiliation the courts protect many of the
practices of parochial schools that are not allowed in public schools.
The courts want to avoid excessive entanglement between the govern-
ment and the church. In the absence of a compelling state interest,
statutory exercise of the police power in a parochial school will not
be tolerated.47 In Meyer v. Nebraska, the state could not show a harm-
ful effect of students learning a second language, so their interference
with the teacher's teaching was prohibited by the Court.
45. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
46. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); First Unitarian Church v. Los
Angeles, 357 U.S. 545 (1958).
47. Meyer v. State of Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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Just as the state cannot legislate instruction in parochial
classrooms, they also may not legislate to parents compulsory at-
tendence by their children in a public school.4' The Supreme Court
in Pierce v. Society of Sisters found as unconstitutional the Compulsory
Education Act of 1922. This act mandated that all parents place their
8-16 year old children in a public school. The Court determined that
Act to be an unreasonable interference by the State with the right
of the parents to educate their children as they see fit.
49
Of course, the most recent case in the Pierce line of reasoning
is Wisconsin v. Yoder.' This case involved an Amish family which
sought to preserve a way of life by keeping their young out of the
public school system. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
ment protected the respondent's sincere religious belief. Where a
religious belief and education are so intertwined, they will generally
outweigh any legitimate interests of the State because of First Amend-
ment guarantees.51 One must come to the conclusion that the court
tries to keep the separation between Church and State intact. It is
difficult in the area of education, because they are often interdepen-
dent. That parochial schools are an integral part of the church they
are affiliated with remains uncontroverted. This being the case, con-
trol by the government over church policies is limited. The use of
tax exemption by the government to implement public policy in
parochial schools is subject to strict scrutiny by the court. The trend
is to disallow such governmental intrusion.
The only major area in which the government has had success
in recent years is discrimination by parochial schools. In Green v. Con-
nally, the Court held that private schools admitting only white
students were not eligible for tax-exempt status. 2 The reason is
because declared public policy dictates otherwise.' The Court never
actually decided the issue with regard to religious private schools.
The Court did suggest that the IRS check an educational institution's
racial policies before granting them an exemption.
The Court did decide the issue finally in 1974 in the case of Bob
Jones University v. Simon.' The Court held that a fundamentalist
school or any parochial school that discriminates by race in admis-
48. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
49. Id.
50. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
51. Id.
52. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (1971), afJ'd sub. nor., Coit v. Green,
404 U.S. 997 (1971).
53. Title IV Civil Rights Act of 1964.
54. Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974).
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sions can lose its tax-exempt status. The fact that discrimination is
part of the religious tenets of the organization makes no difference.
In this case the test of Williams Packing was not met." In trying
to obtain injunctive relief, Bob Jones University had not shown ir-
reparable injury caused by governmental action and they also failed
to show a certainty of success on the merits. As a result of its loss
under section 7421(a), the university was also liable for FICA and
FUTA taxes. Contributions were threatened also because, they were
no longer deductible under section 170(c)(2). This case is very represen-
tative of the enormous economic impact the loss of tax-exempt status
can have on an organization. It is one reason why the court is so
cautious about involving itself in First Amendment issues. The result
on a religious organization can be devastating although appellant here
seemed to weather the storm.
In a related case, a non-profit group lost its exemption and filed
suit to have it restored. The Court held that even though the claims
were of a constitutional nature, the Anti-Injunction Act prevailed.
Under this Act no suit may be maintained "for the purpose of restrain-
ing the assessment or collection of any tax". The taxpayers here met
the same fate as Bob Jones University did. Their case was barred
because they took the wrong path to the right remedy. Instead of
seeking injunctive relief, they should have litigated their claims to
restoration of tax-exempt status. As it turned out, respondents lost
the exemption and with it protection for a substantial amount of
contributions. 6
Three years later, the decision in Bob Jones University was fol-
lowed by a District Court in North Carolina. The court there found
racially discriminatory admission policies as precluding the school from
qualification for exemption from FICA and FUTA taxes. 7 The court
employed a test based upon Gillette and Lemon v. Kurtzman to deter-
mine if legislation is free of Free Exercise problems: 1) is there a
secular legislative purpose?; 2) the enactment has a principal or
primary effect which neither enhances nor inhibits religion; and, 3)
the enactment avoids excessive entanglement with religion.5 8 Apply-
ing this test the court arrived at the result that denying the exemp-
tion here was based on a legitimate state interest and applied accord-
ing to an objective standard.
55. Id.
56. Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. 752 (1974).
57. Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D.
N.C. 1977).
58. Id. at 1320.
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Clearly, the intent of Congress is not to foster racial discrimina-
tion in religious schools in contravention to public policy. The courts
have seen this as one area where First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights are not abridged by denial of tax-exempt status. Thomas
Neuberger and Thomas Crumplar offer additional reforms to this
issue."s They suggest challenging discriminatory policies in a judicial
rather than administrative setting. They also suggest a policy change
through an amendment to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Then schools with discriminatory policies would be violating federal
law as a result of their exempt status. Removal of such status would
be imminent upon failure of the school to take corrective action. They
also suggest an amendment to section 501(c)(3) to warn schools against
racial discrimination. In Neuberger and Crumplar's words, "These
reforms would remove IRS from the business of setting social policy
and return it to the arena of collecting tax revenues. ' '6
B. The Tax-exempt Status of Property Owned By Organized Religion
The constitutionality of a tax exemption granted to church pro-
perty has already been upheld by the Court in Walz.61
Property is perhaps the most sensitive area when discussing
religious tax exemptions. Property is what the layman can most
readily relate to in his or someone else's church. The accumulation
of wealth by a religious organization is based in its property. It is
also what upsets most people when they think about all that tad-free
property. The primary argument of local governments for increasing
the tax base lies in taxing church property. This would reduce the
tax burden on the citizens. As an example, in Ohio churches held $140
million worth of exempt property in 1924 and by 1965 they owned
$600 million worth of exempt property.' Fifteen years later that
amount had grown to over $1.1 billion." In support of the churches,
however, their percentage of the total value of exempted property
in the state has decreased from 19/o in 1924 to 17.4% in 1965" to
13.8% in 1980. These figures are only representative of Ohio, but
59. Neuberger and Crumplar, Tax Exempt Religious Schools Under Attack: Con-
flicting Goals of Religious Freedom and Racial Integration, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 229
(1979).
60. Id. at 276.
61. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
62. Ohio Tax Study Commission Report, "The State and Local Tax Structure
of Ohio" (1967).
63. Department of Tax Equalization in Ohio, V-8 (1979) (revised November 1980).
64. Ohio Tax Study Commission Report, supra note 62.
65. Department of Tax Equalization in Ohio, supra note 63.
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one can see that the amount of exempted church property across the
nation must be enormous.
With all this property in the hands of churches, why don't govern-
ments at all levels just tax it? Aren't the churches getting rich at
the taxpayer's expense? Despite the accumulation of wealth by
churches little is ever done to require churches to pay taxes. The
answer here lies in the fact that most people recognize that religious
organizations benefit the public through their work and they can only
continue such work through public support. Tax exemptions are one
manner by which the public indirectly helps themselves by removing
a burden from the church. The logical conclusion to be drawn here
is that if the churches are taxed and unable to continue their work
because of such tax, the ultimate burden will fall on the taxpayers
to provide the same service or observe a decay in society. Most local
governments would rather grant an exemption to church property.
When determining if property owned by a religious organization
is qualified for tax-exempt status, the focus of the court is on the
use of the property in question. The property generally has to be
used for public worship or in furtherance of religious purposes. Where
a church uses a building it owns for other purposes or leases said
building for unrelated uses, it will be taxed." Commercial activity such
as leasing a building to tenants in business is regarded as secular
and taxable. 7 In order for "incidental" business to be exempt, it must
be so closely related to the church as to be vital to the operation
of the church. 8
Many factors are considered in qualifying a religious organiza-
tion for a property tax exemption. The organization's charter
documents and activities are examined. The institution must be non-
profit and maintain such status. The primary use of the property must
be of benefit to society. 9
In The Lutheran Book Shop v. Bowers, a non-profit corporation
organized for charitable purposes was using part of its net-income
each year for operating capital. The rest was allocated to the Lutheran
Welfare Service of which it was a division. The store operated for
66. Board of Christian Education of Presbyterian Church in United States
v. School District of Philadelphia, 171 Pa. Super. Ct. 610, 91 A.2d 372 (1952).
67. Id.
68. Id. at -, 91 A.2d at 377-8.
69. Pantaleoni, New York's Real Property Tax Exemption for Religious, Educa-
tional, and Charitable Institutions: A Critical Examination, 44 ALBANY L. REV. 488
(1980).
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the benefit of the general public and Lutheran churches, pastors and
teachers. The personal property was fully taxable because it was used
within the purview of the Ohio Revised Code section 5709.01 as pro-
perty used in business. The court reasoned that a substantial portion
of the property was used to compete with commercial concerns. Even
though part of the proceeds were used for charitable work, the test
is the present use of the property not the ultimate use of the
proceeds.
Similarly, even where corporations are operated for the sole pur-
pose of the religious organization, if the purpose is not exclusively
charitable, the exemption will be denied.7 In Evangelical Lutheran
Synod v. Hoehn the prerequisites to tax exemption were not met. The
use had to be "exclusively for religious worship" or "purely charitable".
The Synod claimed it was both and did not satisfy the Missouri Con-
stitution. The fact that the earnings went to the Synod made no dif-
ference. The court states, ". . . our Constitution says tax exempt land
must be used exclusively for religious worship or purposes purely
charitable. A competitive commercial business operated for profit does
not comply with that requirement, even though the profits are devoted
to religion."7
In one of the early significant cases in this area, the court held
that a religious body may not rent or sell land without paying taxes
on that income. 3 Here the Catholic Church tore down its church
building and built a new one. They did this to rent the property where
the old building had stood. The church wanted to use the income to
pay their debt for building. The court again looked at the use of the
property from which the income was derived. If no religious purpose
is made of the property, it is taxable. 4 The court apparently saw this
case as an unnecessary expense on the part of the church. The court
is interested in legitimate uses of the tax exemption for the public
good. That was not the case here.
One exception to the use rule is found in the case of Roman
Catholic Diocese v. City of New York."5 The church here was holding
70. The Lutheran Book Shop v. Bowers, Tax Commissioner, 164 0. St. 359,
131 N.E.2d 219 (1955).
71. Evangelical Lutheran Snyod of Missouri v. Hoehn, 355 Mo. 257, 196 S.W.2d
134 (1946).
72. Id. at -, 196 S.W.2d at 147.
73. Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 404 (1886).
74. Id.
75. The Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, New York v. The City of New
York, 38 Misc. 2d 815, N.Y.S.2d 889 (1963).
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a piece of land for use as a high school when the Korean War period
arose. The United States Government requested the use of the land
as an anti-aircraft base. The Diocese agreed to the government's re-
quest and received only a nominal rent for the use of the land. Under
such circumstances, the Diocese cannot be taxed for the period for
which the land was not used for religious purposes. The Diocese met
the four requirements for the exemption: 1) plaintiff was a corpora-
tion organized for religious or educational purposes exclusively; 2)
plaintiff could not use the land because of the absence of suitable
buildings; 3) plaintiff received no rent income or profit from the land
and; and 4) plaintiff in good faith contemplated using the land for a
religious or educational purpose."6 Also, it would be poor public policy
in this instance to tax a church for donating land to the use of the
government in time of national emergency.
In determining tax-exempt status the primary and almost singular
test of the court will be the use to which the religious organization
put the property. Serious investigation is involved in determining the
ultimate use of a church's property. Because of the impact on all tax-
payers, this issue deserves a careful look. The courts have done a
competent job.
C. Other Income Producing Activities of Religious Organizations
A plethora of cases have developed in the law which cannot be
distinctly placed in the education or property categories. These cases
have arisen mainly because of the provisions relating to tax exemp-
tions regarding political activity and unrelated business income. Con-
gressional intent has been the guide for the court in these cases. This
is also an area that is still developing as novel cases are brought before
the bench every so often. The possibilities here are endless.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 changed the rules of the game with
regard to lobbying by charitable organizations. Congress intended to
have stricter control over the use of contributions received by
charities. The revisions disqualified churches, their integrated aux-
iliaries and a convention or association of churches under section
501(h)(5) I.R.C., however. This does not mean religious organizations
won't lose their exempt status for engaging in too great a degree
of political activity as I have explained before. Congress specifically
intended no approval or disapproval of the decision in Christian Echoes
by its enactment of section 501(h)(5).77
76. Id. at __, 238 N.Y.S.2d at 891-2.
77. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1722 (1976).
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The decision in Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United
States is an interesting one. Christian Echoes was a southern fun-
damentalist Christian organization operated by Dr. Billy James Hargis.
The organization lost its tax-exempt status because of its attempts
to influence legislation. In particular, the organization urged support
of the Becker Amendment for restoration of prayers in public schools.
To accomplish this feat Christian Echoes had intervened in the political
campaigns of candidates supporting the amendment. Thus, their pur-
pose was not exclusively religious, charitable or educational as re-
quired by section 501(c)(3). Under such circumstances, the tax exemp-
tion can be revoked and here it was also made retroactive to the time
Christian Echoes' legislative influencing began." The court quoted the
Supreme Court from Dickinson v. United States: "Tax exemptions are
matters of legislative grace and taxpayers have the burden of
establishing their entitlement to exemptions."79
It appears from this decision that once the exemption is granted
it is not absolute; even for religious organizations. The qualifications
of section 501(c)(3) must be continually met. Any deviation therefrom
could result in a revocation of the exemption.
The question then arises: what constitutes "substantial activity"
enough for a church to lose its exempt status? Most courts use the
test of Seasongood v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.s" In the case
of a former mayor seeking to deduct contributions made to a good
government league, the court held the deduction good because the
League devoted only 5% of its time to influencing legislation.8" This
percentage rule is now often used although a slightly larger percen-
tage may pass the test of the court.
In most circumstances, it has been held that contributions to
groups supporting or opposing legislation are not deductible as
business expenses.' Even where one believes the organization receiv-
ing the contributions is a charitable one, the contributions are not
deductible under section 170(c)(2) if the organization receiving the con-
tributions substantially attempts to influence legislation. 3 The court
78. Christian Echoes, 470 F.2d 849.
79. Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953), cited in Christian Echoes,
470 F.2d at 854.
80. Seasongood v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir.
1955).
81. Id.
82. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
83. Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
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in Haswell v. United States did not believe a percentage test was ap-
propriate. The more appropriate test was believed to be one of a balan-
cing of the political efforts of an organization in the context of that
organization's objectives and circumstances. 4 This would indicate a
close scrutiny by the court. No exemption will be revoked unless clear
proof is shown that the organization substantially has sought to in-
fluence politics. This careful examination is necessary to prevent the
denial of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights in the case of a
religious organization.
For many churches political activity is necessary to spread their
values and faith into everyday life. Leif Clark, as stated before, would
end all restrictions on church lobbying. The excision of the "influenc-
ing legislation" clause would promote a clearer understanding of the
qualifications to be met for tax-exempt status. Churches would still
maintain free exercise of religion and the resulting restrictiveness of
section 501(c)(3) would serve to comfort the government's fears about
legislative subversion. 5 Only churches fulfilling their purpose would
be exempt and the "substantial" test could be tossed out the window.
The effect could be to produce more revenue for the government
because of the resulting decline in qualifying organizations.
Another area of the law that is developing day by day is
unrelated business income. As of the passage of the Tax Reform Act
of 1969, churches are subject to paying taxes on their income not
within the scope of the religious purpose exemption. Tax returns for
this category of income are to be filed on Form 990-T as mentioned
above. Churches are also granted a $1,000 deduction under section
512(b)(12) of the Internal Revenue Code. Dividends, annuities, interest,
royalties, deductions related to income and gains or losses from the
sale or exchange of property are excluded from unrelated income as
well.' The only exception is where under section 512(b)(13), the
organization deriving the income is a controlling organization. Con-
trol is defined as ownership of at least eighty percent of the voting
stock in section 368(c).
Even before the Tax Reform Act of 1969, taxes have been placed
on activities deemed to be without the scope of the exercise of religion
by the local taxing authorities. The most notable of these cases is
Murdock v. Pennsylvania. This case involved the taxing of the sale
84. Id. at 1142.
85. Clark, supra note 31.
86. I.R.C. S 512(b).
87. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
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of religious literature by Jehovah's Witnesses. The state argued, as
did Justice Frankfurter in his dissent, that the solicitation by the
religious colporteurs fell within the commercial venture meaning of
the ordinance. The majority rejected this view by declaring the tax
on Jehovah's Witnesses unconstitutional as a supression of religious
exercise under the First Amendment.88 The activity here was related
to the purpose of the religion and hence, non-taxable.
We have already seen that a religious organization which derives
rent from commercial tenants has taxable unrelated business income. 9
The rationale behind this position is the prevention of an unfair com-
petitive advantage over taxable businesses.0 If a school under the
auspices of organized religion sends out greeting cards in the hope
of receiving charitable contributions, this is not unfair competition.
The income is not taxable under the "low cost articles" exception.
This exception realizes that the proceeds of the solicitation will fully
accrue to the exempt organization." Without a profit being realized
there can be no unrelated business income. An organization's exemp-
tion will not be lost either, if the activity without the scope of the
exemption is merely incidental.92
A different result may occur if the activity of an exempt organiza-
tion falls within section 513. Most recently, this was the case in
Clarence LaBelle Post No. 217, VFW v. United States.93 The VFW Post
here was engaged in bingo games. The income from such games was
ruled taxable by the court as falling within the definition of unrelated
trade or business under section 513(a). The court made an important
ruling here because the activity was not competitive with commer-
cial businesses. That distinction is no longer necessary under section
513 of the Code.' The tax on bingo games could have had important
ramifications for religious organizations, particularly the Catholic
Church, except for the fact that bingo games are now excluded from
the term "unrelated trade or business". The same year the VFW case
was decided, the Congress amended the Internal Revenue Code by
passing section 513(f). This section emasculates the decision in Clarence
LaBelle Post No. 217, VFW. The added section allows exempt organiza-
88. Id.
89. Board of Christian Education, 171 Pa. Super. Ct. 610, 91 A.2d 372.
90. The Hope School v. United States, 612 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. dis-
missed, 439 U.S. 1040 (1980).
91. Id.
92. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. United States, 374 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. 1967).
93. Clarence LaBelle Post No. 217, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United
States v. United States, 580 F.2d 270 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 1040 (1978).
94. Id.
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tions to conduct bingo games without being subject to taxation ex-
cept when they are contrary to state or local law or compete with
for-profit bingo games. No doubt religious organizations had some in-
fluence in the passage of this legislation.
A final area of discussion in this section involves employment
in the church. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that
no private employer may discriminate in employment. Originally,
religious organizations were given an exemption under section 702
of this title. However, due to amendments to this section by Senators
Humphrey and Ervin, the present view is not clear. The most viable
positions are that the religious group may discriminate on the basis
of religion only in respect to all activities or they may discriminate
on any basis in respect to religious activities only. 5 Any other method
of discrimination would result in a loss of tax-exempt status as the
activity would be contrary to public policy.
Once employed many persons are under the belief that members
of the clergy or other church employees do not pay taxes. This is
not true. Employees of the church pay taxes like everyone else ex-
cept if they are not compensated for their work. Then there is no
need to pay taxes, of course.
Members of religious orders who have taken a vow of poverty
may or may not have to pay taxes on their earnings depending on
the source of the income. Firstly, if the services are performed for
the church or an agency or associated institution of the church, the
remuneration remitted to the church is not subject to federal income
tax or FICA withholding under Revenue Ruling 77-290. Secondly, if
the services are performed for a charitable institution such as a hospital,
agency must be established to exempt the income from taxes. Thirdly,
if the member is performing "secular" services in the private sector,
it is presumed no agency exists. Revenue Rulings 76-323 and 77-290
include the tax in the member's gross income and subject it to federal
income tax and FICA withholding. The member may deduct any part
of the remuneration given to the religious order, however, under sec-
tion 170.96 The situations discussed above may result in taxable in-
come to the religious order under section 511 because of the agency
created. The activity may be unrelated to the exempt function of the
order.
Another issue concerning employment by a church was decided
95. D. KELLY, supra note 23, at 128.
96. Wittenbach, Remuneration Earned by Members of Religious Orders: Is It
Taxable?, 57 TAXES 553, 558 (1979).
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recently by the Supreme Court.9 7 The case involved an elementary
Christian day school and unemployment compensation taxes im-
posed by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA). The pivotal
factor here was the control of the Church over the school. The school
was financed by the Church and controlled by a Board elected from
the congregation. The school was not independently incorporated or
a separate legal entity in any way. The employees were determined
by the Court to be in the employ of the Church. Thus, the Church
was exempt from unemployment compensation taxes under 26 U.S.C.
section 3309(b)(1)(A). 9 It appears that the relationship between the
church and the employee is the relevant factor in the payment or
nonpayment of employment taxes. This relationship revolves around
the control exercised by the employer church over the employee. St.
Martin dealt only with unemployment taxes under FUTA. Income
taxes and FICA must be paid except on remuneration to the church.
The activities of a religious organization are well guided by
legislation and case law. Tax-exempt status may be removed for failure
to meet these guidelines. On the other hand, guidelines not compati-
ble with the First and Fourteenth Amendments will be voided. The
key to understanding the application of section 501(c)(3) and its related
sections is an awareness that tradition and public policy will control
absent exigent circumstances. Courts will look to see if the religious
or charitable purpose of a religious organization is being fulfilled
through its activity. If it is, there is no problem. If not, the court
will make a determination as to the present tax liability of the
organization and its future status. The court's guidelines are the In-
ternal Revenue Code, other legislation, and the common law.
III. PRESENT VIEWS AND FUTURE QUESTIONS
A. Present Views
When discussing the topic of tax exemptions, the cries of those
opposed to such exemptions must be heard. Previous attempts to deny
religious organizations their exempt status have already been explored.
The basic theme of anti-exemptionists is relief of the tax burden on
themselves and others. But what really is at the root of their com-
plaints? Is it the fact that they don't like organized religion? That
probably was the reason in one case." Are they just jealous of such
status or is there a more sound reason for such animosity?
97. St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772
(1981).
98. Id.
99. Murray, 241 Md. 383, 216 A.2d 897.
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The basic argument actually is not that tax exemptions place
more of the burden on the taxpayers, but that it works as a govern-
ment subsidy of religion. This flies in the face of the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. Professor Bittker would counteract
this argument by saying that religious organizations were not excluded
by the legislature when the Revenue Code was drafted; they just were
not included."
The subsidy argument of anti-exemptionists is a weak one. The
government does not give the church revenue, it simply abstains from
taking any. Without contributions from its religious faithful, the church
would have nothing in the way of revenue. Subsidies are based on
exact amounts determined by administrators or legislatures. Any
religious leader will tell you he never knows how much he can de-
pend on from church members. Churches never have to lobby for
government support, because they are not receiving anything by ex-
emption. The government through tax exemption is trying to separate
itself from the church, not bring the two closer together.' Thus, the
establishment through subsidy argument fails.
Some anti-exemptionists would then argue that tax exemptions
are invalid because they are too exclusive. The argument here
resembles an inverse Equal Protection argument. Church revenue is
protected by the exemption while the income of some other organiza-
tions or persons is not. The exemption is exclusive when used in the
context that certain income of a religious organization will be exempt
under the Code and certain income will not. In the context of exempt-
ing certain organizations only, however, the argument is unfounded.
The Supreme Court put this argument to rest in Lennhausen v. Lake
Shore Auto Parts Co. when Mr. Justice Douglas referred to it as "only
a relic of a bygone era." ' 2 Section 501(c)(3) contains twenty-two dif-
ferent subsections of exempt organizations. The exemption for religious
organizations is by no means exclusively theirs.
The term "exclusive" is also used by anti-exemptionists in the
context that it excludes religious organizations from the benefits of
government revenue. 03 This is exactly the opposite of the establish-
ment argument. Here the anti-exemptionists would argue that a
burden is placed on the church by the government. The exclusion from
taxes means that churches must survive on their contributions from
100. Bittker, Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78 YALE L. REV. 1285 (1969).
101. D. KELLY, supra note 23, at 33.
102. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973), reh'g den.,
411 U.S. 910 (1973).
103. Bittker, supra note 100.
19831
Hageman: An Examination of Religious Tax Exemption Policy Under Section 50
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1983
428 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17
members and other supporters. This is a contravention of the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. This argument is not
realistic at all. Churches have had no trouble, to my knowledge, exer-
cising their religious faith because of tax exemption. To the contrary,
churches wish no revenue from the government if they can help it,
because it would come with strings attached. Government aid is rarely
accepted. The only tax limitations on the free exercise of religion in-
volve political lobbying and unrelated business income. These limita-
tions are necessary and proper under the "exclusive purpose" doctrine.
Even if the exemption were lifted, would it be lifted from all
church activity? How would we then tax religious organizations? Some
are incorporated and could be taxed at the corporate rate, but most
are not incorporated. Should they be taxed as natural persons or as
charitable trusts? Couldn't a church deduct all contributions spent for
the betterment of mankind? Afterall, charity is the "business" of a
religious organization." These questions arise because our society has
never really considered taxing religious organizations. If the exemp-
tions are removed from their charitable work, we would begin to see
less aid to society's ills as churches would be hampered with a tax
burden.
One final anti-exemption argument that is often heard is that
churches do not pay their fair share of the burden necessary to pro-
vide the- community with essential services. This would include police
and fire protection and hospitals and the like. Anti-exemptionists
justify their argument on the ground that "ability to pay" is the
primary ingredient. If we follow this logic, churches would soon be
paying more to the state than they would be receiving in benefits."'5
Some churches are beginning to adopt the idea of making voluntary
payments to the municipality in which they reside in lieu of the
possibility of perhaps being taxed. Churches recognize that they
benefit from essential services and they feel a need to support such
programs. However, the result of such voluntary payments or taxing
is to take money from the social programs of the church and decrease
the benefits to society in most cases. Asking religious organizations
to bear their share of the essential services burden may have the
effect of eliminating the essential services which religious organiza-
tions now provide for society.
No discussion of religious tax exemptions would be complete
without hearing from the churches themselves. The National Council
104. Id.
105. Id.
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of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America adopted
a policy statement on this issue in 1969. In it the Council recognizes
the New Testament advice to pay taxes to governing authorities (Mat-
thew 17:24, 22:19; Romans 13:6). Churches should not therefore ask
for support from the government, but only protection for their freedom
to proclaim the gospel. The Council appreciates the fact that tax ex-
emption means no government can interfere with the free exercise
of religion. The church is not built on tax exemption, however, but
the donations of its adherents. Tax exemptions also foster non-profit
voluntary organizations.
Christians will not sit back and let their tax exemption be con-
ditional, however. Loyalty oaths and restraints on political activity
may inhibit their obedience to God. In such a case, separate auxiliaries
of the church may have to be set up.
With regard to property, the Council agrees that churches should
pay taxes on property not used primarily for religious purposes.
Churches should also be willing to pay their share of essential services.
The Council favors legislation designed to require payment by
churches to the social security tax for their lay or clerical personnel.
The only exception would be to exclude those persons barred by a
vow of poverty.
Full disclosure by churches of their unrelated business enter-
prises, income, expenditures, assets and liabilities was also approved
by the Council. Then there would be no question about the use of
contributions and the public could better understand the need for the
tax exemption.1"
James E. Wood, Jr. spoke for the Baptist Joint Committee on
Public Affairs before the House of Representatives Committee on
Ways and Means in 1976. The occasion was a hearing on limiting in-
fluence of legislation by public charities. Mr. Wood proposed to speak
only for the consensus of Baptist Churches. He was trying to have
churches disqualified from the bill under consideration and he was
ultimately successful. At the hearing Mr. Wood stated:
Because some churches define their religious missions as
including obligation to speak out on and attempt to influence
public affairs, we hold to do so is part of their constitu-
tionally protected religious liberty. The state may not deny
or limit that right. Neither may it require that a church
106. D. KELLY, supra note 23.
1983]
Hageman: An Examination of Religious Tax Exemption Policy Under Section 50
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1983
430 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17
give up its right to the "free exercise" of religion under
the First Amendment to be eligible to gain a statutory
privilege (e.g. tax exemption).
For these and other reasons we have not been able
to accept the legitimacy of the "substantiality" clause of
sec. 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. This we
consider to be an unconstitutional limitation on the religious
missions of churches .... 107
It appears from this statement that the Baptist Churches want their
tax exemption free from any government influence whatsoever.
The Lutheran Council in the United States of America on behalf
of The American Lutheran Church and Lutheran Church in America
submitted a statement to the same hearings of the Ways and Means
Committee as above. The essence of the statement was support for
the changes in the bill submitted by Representative Barber Conable.
Those provisions include the current disqualification of churches from
section 501(c)(3) of the Code and no intent by Congress to either ap-
prove or disapprove of the decision in Christian Echoes. The Lutheran
Council took a somewhat different approach to the proposed legislation:
The churches look with deep regret on legislation which
could discriminate between those churches which see it as
their essential ministry to speak to society on matters of
public interest, including legislation, and those who do not.
Many of us see the ministry of advocacy not as an effort
to lobby for political power, but as a vital exercise of pro-
phetic authority central to our faith. The free exercise of
religion, therefore, should mean that the decision to speak
or not to speak in the public arena be left to the individual
churches and not be a determiner of tax exempt status or
the deductibility of gifts to the church.'
As part of the research for this paper, I have requested per-
sonal opinions on the subject of religious tax exemptions from several
church leaders across the land. A representative view is the follow-
ing statement from The Reverend Doctor Robert C. Sauer, First Vice-
President of The Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod: " ... I personally
regard religious institutions to be of value to the state in that they
almost without exception (Jehovah's Witnesses) teach their adherents
107. Influencing Legislation, Hearings on H.R. 13500, supra note 12, at 64 (State-
ment of James E. Wood, Jr.).
108. Id. at 75 (Statement of The Lutheran Council in the U.S.A.).
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to obey those in authority and also infuse into society a morality which
is beneficial for the common good." With those words The Reverend
Doctor Sauer expressed the support most church leaders have for
religious tax exemptions and the sound reasoning behind such support.
The United Presbyterian Church and the United Methodist
Church released policy statements about unrelated business income
in 1963 and 1968 respectively. This was before the changes made in
the Internal Revenue Code by Congress in 1969. Both churches sup-
port taxation of unrelated business income and favor the abolition of
special tax privileges for members of the clergy."°9 Clearly neither
church wants government exemptions for activity outside the scope
of religion. The Presbyterian Church's statement included the follow-
ing which seems to summarize the view of all or almost all of organized
religion in this country on the subject of tax exemptions:
... the state should know that it may not expect from the
church in return for favors extended of its own free will,
any quid pro quo in the form of a muting of the church's
prophetic voice, nor should the state expect the church to
accept the role of an uncritical instrument of support for
the state's programs, or of any other conscious dilution of
its supreme loyalty to Jesus Christ."0
B. Future Questions
This brings us to the final point of discussion-what about the
future? Congress has modified the law regarding tax exemptions twice
in the last twelve years. The courts see tax exemption cases fre-
quently. Many of the cases cited here are as recent as 1970. St. Mar-
tin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota was decided in the
Spring of 1981. The point is that the law with regard to religious tax
exemptions is a never ending process, so we must prepare for the
future course of events.
The current Administration has as the focus of its program a
shift back to the private sector and less reliance on government. This
policy applies also to charitable works, if not especially to it. The in-
creased burden on charities and among them churches is the strongest
argument yet in favor of the tax exemption.
One of the immediate problems facing this issue came with the
passage of the 1981 Economic Recovery Act. By this Act gift tax
109. D. KELLY, supra note 23, at 136-8.
110. Id. at 137.
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returns are not required for interspousal transfers, because such gifts
are no longer taxable. Also, the annual gift tax exclusion has been
raised from $3,000 to $10,000 per donee effective January 1, 1982.111
The consequences of these changes could be devastating on religious
organizations. Many persons would rather keep money in the family
than give it to any charity. The new Act provides the access to
unalienable wealth that many families desire. The spousal benefits
are extremely generous. The question to be determined is: What ef-
fect will the Economic Recovery Act have on the manner in which
persons distribute their wealth? Will the churches suffer and liter-
ally prove that they are dependent on their supporters? It would seem
a sad way to conclusively show tax exemptions are not subsidies.
Similar relief from estate taxes may have the same effect.
The adverse effects wrought by the estate and gift tax relief
may have been counterbalanced by a provision under the individual
tax relief section of the bill. Taxpayers may now deduct charitable
contributions even if not itemized. By 1986, 100 percent of eligible
contributions (up to $100) are deductible. This provision may encourage
more contributions to religious organizations. The deductible ceiling
is not as high as the gift and estate tax relief, however, so the result
of this provision is still awaiting determination.11
Education in the future will still have its public policy considera-
tions. I do not foresee discrimination in education by religious organiza-
tions ever being held valid under the requirements of section 501(c)(3).
The question of tuition tax credits is very much an issue in vogue
with potential ramifications for Church and State alike. Opponents
of such credits claim they serve to establish religion and are an ex-
cessive entanglement of Church and State. Supporters of such credits
claim the aid will be used primarily to benefit students in colleges
and universities primarily. Such government aid has already been ap-
proved by the Supreme Court. The aid would constitute a subsidy,
which could be termed an establishment of religion, except for the
fact that the aid applies to all private schools, religious and non-
religious alike. The credit would serve to save the government money
because of a switch in school population. The government could then
upgrade its own schools because of the increased revenue. The pur-
pose of a tax exemption is also served by a credit for private educa-
tion, because the public welfare is served by religious schools and
their graduates. The only entanglement between government and
church here is the paperwork.
111. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, S 441 (1981).
112. Id., S 121.
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The decision in Walz seems to have decreed property tax ex-
emptions for religious organizations for a long time to come. The use
of such property remains the key factor. More and more religious
organizations own property outside of the church and parking lot these
days. Church owned property represents the largest class of private
property under the exemption in America today. It is also the primary
reason for anti-exemptionists, because most church property is tangi-
ble. Many churches have grown so large that one begins to feel they
have set aside their religious purpose. Churches are big business
today-at least it seems that way. Perhaps our controls on such pro-
perty through the "exclusive purpose" doctrine and the unrelated
business tax are no longer adequate. Perhaps we should tax religious
organizations at the corporate tax rate. The disparity in income be-
tween large churches and small ones should not be forgotten here.
A tax on large religious institutions would not be as detrimental to
them as it would be to a small institution. If you take food away from
a rich man and a poor man, the rich man will only be hungry, but
the poor man may die.
What about the growing marriage between religion and televi-
sion? Certainly the contributions are not taxable, but what about the
copyrights and church-owned networks? Most would agree these are
also tax exempt. They fall within the "religious purpose doctrine."
Wouldn't the Gospel be spread without the excesses of television all
the same? How far will the "religious purpose doctrine" extend? These
are questions which the Supreme Court will one day have to decide.
A related issue involved the practices of religious cults. Are they
exempt within the meaning of section 501(c)(3)? The Reverend Sun
Yung Moon has recently been convicted for tax evasion, because church
funds were placed into his personal bank account. This practice would
lead one to believe contributions to cults are not exempt. The Moonies,
as they are called, control much property outside the purpose of public
worship. Surely they are paying taxes on this income.
The Hare Krishnas sell literature in airport terminals to un-
suspecting travelers. Is the revenue from the sale taxable? Could one
deduct such a contribution? The answers would seem to depend on
how charitable a cult is and the beneficial effect derived by society
through the cult's religious works.
The involvement of some religious groups in politics is hard to
prevent. Some religious organizations are adamant about governmental
interference, yet they interfere in the business of government all the
time. To use an old expression: They want their cake and eat it too.
The current disqualification of churches under the new political lob-
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bying by charitable organizations section of the Revenue Code may
be repealed before long because of this attitude. The current fun-
damentalist trend toward religion in politics by groups such as the
Moral Majority may prompt the end of tax-exempt status of organ-
ized religion as we know it today. It won't be long before preachers
using the pulpit for politics will spoil the benefits of the tax exemp-
tion for all churches. Such practice completely contravenes the Con-
gressional intent of section 501(c)(3), although it may still serve to pro-
mote the general welfare if effective enough.
In the future, inflation may also mean an end to the present tax
exemption system. Inflation is the most powerful ally anti-
exemptionists have. Spiraling costs have meant decreased revenue for
government on all levels and forced them to tap new sources of in-
come. Churches have been sheltered so far, but how long it will last
no one knows. Necessity can be a strong force to motivate officials
to use the quick solution of taxing churches. The local governments
are struggling to survive. The federal Social Security system is in
deep trouble. One by one the church's exemptions from various taxes
may fall. For the moment, however, religious organizations seem
destined to remain exempt from unemployment taxes for their
employees because of the decision recently in St. Martin Evangelical
Lutheran Church.
Religious organizations are not impervious to the needs of govern-
ment. Many want to help financially and not just sociologically. Con-
tributions by religious groups in lieu of taxes in order to maintain
essential services have been suggested as mentioned before."'3 This
would seem to be a viable solution and one which may preserve the
religious tax exemption as well. As one can see, there are many ques-
tions for the future and no concrete solutions as yet. Both sides are
sensitive to each other's needs, however.
CONCLUSION
Ever since Jesus spoke those words "... render to Caesar the
things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's" (Luke
20:25), there has been a marked separation between Church and State.
Part of this separation involves the payment of taxes to the State.
Church followers have paid their individual taxes, but the State in
this country has seen fit to exempt the Church itself from the pay-
113. D. KELLY, supra note 23.
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ment of taxes. The history of this exemption is rich in tradition. It
has been adopted in some form by every Revenue Act ever passed
by Congress. The basic premise upon which the exemption is based
is that the general welfare will be more enriched by the charitable
way in which the religious organization uses the money than it would
if the government were to make use of the money.
The exemption for religious organizations is also protected by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The states can no more en-
tangle themselves with religion than can the federal government.
Critics charge tax exemptions for churches constitute an establish-
ment of religion because they act as a subsidy. These contentions are
often unfounded because an exemption excludes churches from taxes
and does not include them in government support. Churches still rely
on contributions from their members.
Not much has been said about non-Christian religions in this
paper, but the same rules apply to their exemptions. They haven't
been mentioned often because the case law on these organizations
is scarce. The Congress has drafted section 501(c)(3) and its relevant
counterparts very carefully. The courts have not broadened the scope
of these sections one degree. The legislative intent, as well as public
policy, have always been upheld. A tax exemption does not give a
church license to engage in any activity it pleases completely tax free.
We have already discussed the many restraints placed upon the
privilege by Congress and the courts.
Time and again the courts have judiciously upheld the constitu-
tionality of religious tax exemption. Their efforts are to be applaud-
ed. In education, the exemption must bow to public policy against
racial discrimination. The exemption must also yield when religious
groups engage in undue influence of legislation. Taxes must be paid
on unrelated business properties and by employees of religious in-
stitutions. Most religious organizations agree that these limitations
are fair.
Where do we go from here? Perhaps some minimal support by
churches for struggling local government is necessary. Many unre-
solved questions are left to be answered. I would conclude my exami-
nation of religious tax exemptions by saying they are necessary now
and will be in the future. The road of religious tax exemptions may
be narrower in the future, but it will still be straight.
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